SCIENCE AND BUDDHISM 105 Hume follows by apply ing an identical process of reasoning to the phenomena of mind.1 Let us consider the Hindu theory . They classify the phenomena (whether well or ill matters nothing), but represent them all as pictured in, but not affecting, a certain changeless, omniscient, blissful existence called Atman. Holding to Theism , the ex- istence of evil forces them to the Fichtean position that “the Ego posits the Non-Ego,” and we learn that nothing really exists after all but Brahm. They then distinguish between Jivatma, the soul-conditioned, and Paramatma, the s oul free; the former being the basis of our normal consciousness; the latter of the Nirvikalpa-Samadhi conscious- 1 The Buddhist position may be interpreted as agnostic in this matter, these ar guments being directed against, and destructive of , the unwarranted assumptions of the Hindus; but no more. See Sabbasava Sutta, 10. “In him , thus unwisely consider ing, ther e springs up one or other of the six (absurd) notions. “As something real and true he gets the notion, ‘I have a self.’ “As something real and true he gets the notion, ‘I have not a self.’ “As something real and true he gets the notion, ‘By my self, I am conscious of my self.’ “As something r eal and tr ue he gets the notion, ‘By my self, I am conscious of m y non-self.’ “Or again, he gets the notion, ‘This soul of mine can be perceived, it has exper ienced the r esult of good or evil actions com mitted here and there; now this soul of m ine is permanent, lasting, eternal, has the inhe rent quality of never changing, and will contiue for ever and ever!’ “This, brethren, is called the walking in de- lusion, the jungle of delusion, the wilder ness of delusion, the puppet- show of delusion, the writhing of delusion, the fetter of delusion.” There are, it may be noted, only five ( not six) notions mentioned, unless we take the last as double. Or we m ay consider the sixth as the contrary of the f ifth, and correct. The whole passage is highly technical, per haps untrustworthy; in any case, this is not the place to discuss it. T he sun of Agnosticism br eaking through the cloud of Anatta is the phenomenon to which I wished to call attention.—A. C. ness; this being the sole condition on which morals, religion, and fees to priests can continue. For the Deist has only to advance his fundamental idea to be forced round in a vicious circle of absurdities.1 The Buddhist makes a clean sweep of all this sort of nonsense. He analy ses the phe- nomena of mind, adopting Berkeley ’s para- dox that “matter is immaterial,” in a sane and orderly way. The “common-sense Phi- losopher,” whom I leave to chew the bitter leaves of Professer Huxley ’s Essay “On Sensation and the Unity of the Structure of Sensiferous Organs,” observes, on lifting h is arm, “I lift my arm.” The Buddhist ex- amines this proposition closely, and begins: “There is a lifting of an arm.” By this terminology he avoids Teutonic discussions concerning the Ego and Non- ego.2 But how does he know this proposi- tion to be true? By sensation. The fact is therefore: “There is a sensation of the lifting of an arm.” But how does he know that? By percep- tion. Therefore he says: “There is a perception of a sensation, &c.” And why this perception? From the in- herent tendency. (Note carefully the determinist standpoint involved in the enunciation of his Fourth Skandha; and that it comes lower than Viññanam.) “There is a tendency to perceive the sensation, &c.” And how does he know that there is a tendency ? By consciousness . The final analysis reads: “There is a consciousness of a tendency to perceive the sensation of a lifting of an arm.” He does not, for he cannot, go further back. He will not suppose, on no sort of evidence, the substratum of Atman uniting 1 As Bishop Butler so conclusively showed. 2 I m ay in cidentally rem ark th at a very few hours’ practice (see Section VIII.) cause “ I lift my arm” to be intuitively denied.—A. C.