Collected Works (Vol. II)

254 SCIENCE AND BUDDHISM this term. And I am convinced in my own mind that the Ananda (bliss) of Dhyana will surely arise long before one has passed even up to Sankhara, And for the reality, ‘twill be a brave jest, my masters, to fling back on the materialists that-terrible gibe of Voltaire’s at the mystery- mongers of his day: ‘‘Ils nient ce qui est, et expliquent ce qui n’est pas.” Note To Section VIII. Transfigured Realism. I will not waste my own time and that of my readers by any lengthy discussion of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s ‘‘ Transfigured Realism.” I will not point out in greater detail how he proposes, by a chain of reasoning, to over- throw the conclusions he admits as being those of reason. But his statement that Idealism is but verbally intelligible is for my purpose the most admirable thing he could have said. He is wrong in saying that the idealists are bewildered by their own terminology; the fact is that idealist conclusions Are pre- sented directly to consciousness, when that consciousness is Dhyanic. (Cf. Section XI.) Nothing is clearer to my mind than that the great difficulty habitually experienced by the normal mind in the assimilation of meta- physics is due to the actual lack of experi- ence in the mind of the reader of the phenomena discussed. I will go so far as to say that perhaps Mr. Spencer himself is so bitter because he himself has actual ex- perience of ‘‘ Transfigured Realism” as a directly presented phenomenon; for if he supposes that the normal healthy mind can perceive what he perceives, Berkeley’s argu- ments must seem to him mere wanton stupidity. I class the Hindu philosophy with the Idealist; the Buddhistic with that of Mr. Herbert Spencer; the great difference be- tween the two being that the Buddhists re- cognise clearly these (or similar) conclusions as phenomena, Mr. Spencer, inconsistently enough, only as truths verified by a higher and more correct reasoning than that of his opponents. We recognise, with Berkeley, that reason teaches us that the testimony of conscious- ness is untrue; it is absurd, with Spencer, to refute reason; instead we take means to bring consciousness to a sense of its impro- bity. Now our (empiric) diagnosis is that it is the dissipation of mind that is chiefly re- sponsible for its untruthfulness. We seek (also by empiric means, alas!) to control it, to con- centrate it, to observe more accurately—has this source of possible error been sufficiently recognised ?—what its testimony really is. Experience has taught me, so far as I have been able to go, that Reason and Conscious- ness have met together; Apprehension and Analysis have kissed one another. The re- conciliation (in fact, remember, and not in words) is at least so nearly perfect that I can confidently predict that a further pursuit of the (empirically-indicated) path will surely lead to a still further and higher unity. The realisation of the hopes held out by the hypothesis is then of clear evidential value in support of that hypothesis, empiric as it was, and is. But with the growth and gathering-together, classifying, criticism of our facts, we are well on the way to erect a surer structure on a broader basis. IX. AGNOSTICISM. It should be clearly understood, and well remembered, that throughout all these medi- tations and ideas, there is no necessary way to any orthodox ontology whatever. As to the way of salvation, we are not to rely on the Buddha; the vicious lie of vicarious atonement finds no place here. The Buddha himself does not escape the law of causation ; if this be metaphysics, so far Buddhism is metaphysical, but no further. While deny- ing obvious lies, it does not set up dogmas; all its statements are susceptible of proof-— a child can assent to all the more important.