Collected Works (Vol. II)

250 SCIENCE AND BUDDHISM Vil. THE RELATIVE REALITY OF CERTAIN STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Whether we adopt Herbert Spencer’s dictum that the primary testimony of con- sciousness is to the existence of externality, or no ;! whether or no we fly to the extreme idealistic position ; there is no question that, to our normal consciousness, things as they present themselves — apart from obvious illusion, if even we dare to except this—-are undisprovable to the immediate apprehen- sion. Whatever our reason may tell us, we act precisely as though Berkeley had never lived, and the herculean Kant had been strangled while yet in his cradle by the twin serpents of his own perversity and termi- nology. What criterion shall we apply to the relative realities of normal and dream con- sciousness? Why do I confidently assert that the dream state is transitory and un- real? In that state I am equally confident that my normal consciousness is invalid. But as my dreams occupy a relatively small portion of my time, and as the law of causa- tion seems suspended, and as their vividness is less than that of normal consciousness, and above all, as in the great majority of cases I can show a cause, dating from my waking hours, for the dream, I have four strong reasons (the first explanatory to some extent of my reasons for accepting the others) for concluding that the dream is fictitious. But what of the ‘‘ dreamless” state? To the dreamer his normal faculties and memo- ries arise at times, and are regarded as frag- mentary and absurd, even as the remembrance of a dream is to the waking man. Can we not conceive then of a ‘‘dreamless ” life, of 1 Mahasatipa¢¢hana (Sec. VIII.) does admit this perhaps. Yet its very object is to correct consciousness on the lines indicated by reason. which our dreams are the vague and dis- turbed transition to normal consciousness ? The physiological evidence goes literally for nothing. Even were it proved that the recipio-motor apparatus of a ‘‘ dreamless ” sleeper was relatively quiescent, would that supply any valid argument against the theory I have suggested? Suggested, for I admit that our present position is completely ag- nostic in respect to it, since we have no evidence which throws light on the matter ; and study of the subject would appear to be mere waste of time. But the suggestion is valuable as affording us a possibly rational explanation, conform- able to the waking man, which the dreamer would indignantly reject. Suppose, however, a dream so vivid that the whole waking man is abased before its memory, that his consciousness of it appears a thousand times more real than that of the things about him; suppose that his whole life is moulded to fit the new facts thus re- vealed to him ; that he would cheerfully re- nounce years of normal life to obtain minutes of that dream-life; that his time sense is uprooted as never before, and that these influences are permanent. Then, you will say, delirium tremens (and the intoxication of hashish, in respect more particularly of the time sense) afford us a parallel. But the phenomena of delirium tremens do not occur in the healthy. As for the suggestion of auto-hypnosis, the memory of the ‘‘ dream ” is a sufficient reply. Ilowever this may be, the simple fact of the superior apparent reality—a conviction unshakable, zs‘pzzsable (for the English has no word), is a sufficient test. And if we condescend to argue, it is for pleasure, and aside from the vital fact; a skirmish, and not a pitched battle. The ‘‘dream ” I have thus described is the state called Dhyana by the Hindus and Buddhists. The method of attaining it is sane, healthy, and scientific. I would not take the pains to describe that method, had not illiterate, and too often mystical advo- cates of the practice obscured the simple