Collected Works (Vol. II)

SCIENCE AND BUDDHISM 247 Hume follows by applying an identical pro- cess of reasoning to the phenomena of mind.! Let us consider the Hindu theory. They classify the phenomena (whether well or ill matters nothing), but represent them all as pictured in, but not affecting, a certain changeless, omniscient, blissful existence called Atman. Holding to Theism, the ex- istence of evil forces them to the Fichtean position that “the Ego posits the Non-Ego,” and we learn that nothing really exists after all but Brahm. They then distinguish between Jivatma, the soul-conditioned; and Paramatma, the soul free; the former being the base of our normal consciousness; the latter of the Nirvikalpa-Samadhi conscious- 1 ‘The Buddhist position may be interpreted as agnostic in this matter, these arguments being directed against, and destructive of, the unwarranted assumptions of the Hindus; but no more. See Sabbasava Sutta, ro. ‘‘In him, thus unwisely considering, there springs up one or other of the six (absurd) notions. ‘**As something real and true he gets the notion, ‘I have a self.’ ‘‘As something real and notion, ‘I have not a self.’ ‘*As something real and notion, ‘By my self, I am self,’ ‘‘As something real and notion, ‘ By my self, I am non-self,’ : ‘Or again, he gets the notion, ‘ This soul of mine can be perceived, it has experienced the result of good or evil actions committed here and there; now this soul of mine is permanent, lasting, eternal, has the inherent quality of never changing, and will continue for ever and ever !' ‘* This, brethren, is called the walking in de- lusion, the jungle of delusion, the wilderness of delusion, the puppet-show of delusion, the writhing of delusion, the fetter of delusion.” There are, it may be noted, only five (not six) notions mentioned, unless we take the last as double. Or we may consider the sixth as the contrary of the fifth, and correct. The whole passage is highly technical, perhaps un- trustworthy; in any case, this is not the place to discuss it. The sun of Agnosticism breaking through the cloud of Anatta is the phenomenon to whichI wished to call attention.—A. C., true he gets the the my true he gets conscious of the my true he gets conscious of ness; this being the sole condition on which morals, religion, and fees to priests can con- | tinue. For the Deist has only to advance his fundamental idea to be forced round in a vicious circle of absurdities.1 The Buddhist makes a clean sweep of all this sort of nonsense. He analyses the phe- nomena of mind, adopting Berkeley’s para- dox that ‘‘ matter is immaterial,’ in a sane and orderly way. The ‘‘ common-sense Phi- losopher,” whom I leave to chew the bitter leaves of Professor Huxley’s Essay ‘‘ On Sensation and the Unity of the Structure of Sensiferous Organs,” observes, on lifting his arm, ‘‘I lift my arm.” The Buddhist ex- amines this proposition closely, and begins: ‘‘ There is a lifting of an arm.” By this terminology he avoids Teutonic discussions concerning the Ego and Non- ego.” But how does he know this proposi- tion to be true? By sensation. The fact is therefore: ‘* There is a sensation of the lifting of an arm.” But how does he know that? By percep- tion. Therefore he says: ‘“ There is a perception of a sensation, &c.” And why this perception? From the in- herent tendency. (Note carefully the determinist standpoint involved in the enunciation of this Fourth Skandha; and that it comes lower than Vififianam. ) ‘‘There is a tendency to perceive the sensation, &c.”’ And how does he know there is a ten- dency? By consciousness. The final analysis reads: ‘* There is a consciousness of a tendency to perceive the sensation of a lifting of an arm.” . | He does not, for he cannot, go further back. He will not suppose, on no sort of evidence, the substratum of Atman uniting 1 As Bishop Butler so conclusively showed. 2 I may incidentally remark that a very few hours’ practice (see Section VIII.) cause ‘1 lift my arm”’ to be intuitively denied.—A. C,