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193
the impossible, the already violated in the
act of commanding, but a bitter commentary
on the foul evil of this aimless, hopeless
universe, this compact of misery, meanness,
and cruelty. Let us pass on.
THE SECOND PRECEPT.
The Second Precept is directed against theft.
Theft is the appropriation to one’s own use
of that to which another has a right. Let us
see therefore whether or no the Buddha was
a thief. The answer of course is in the
affirmative. For to issue a command is to
attempt to deprive another of his most precious
possession—the right to do as he will; that
is, unless, with the predestinarians, we hold
that action is determined absolutely, in which
case, of course, a command is as absurd as
it is unavoidable. Excluding this folly, there-
fore, we may conclude that if the command
be obeyed—and those of Buddha have gained
a far larger share of obedience than those of
any other teacher—the Enlightened One was
not only a potential but an actual thief,
Further, all voluntary action limits in some
degree, however minute, the volition of others.
If I breathe, I diminish the stock of oxygen
available on the planet. In those far distant
ages when Earth shall be as dead as the moon
is to-day, my breathing now will have robbed
some being then living of the dearest necessity
of life,
That the theft is minute, incalculably trifling,
is no answer to the moralist, to whom degree
is not known; nor to the scientist, who sees
the chain of nature miss no link.
If, on the other hand, the store of energy
in the universe be indeed constant (whether
infinite or no), if personality be indeed delusion,
then theft becomes impossible, and to forbid
it is absurd. We may argue that even so
temporary theft may exist; and that this is
so is to my mind no doubt the case. All
theft is temporary, since even a millionaire
must die; also it is universal, since even a
Buddha must breathe.
THE THIRD PRECEPT.
This precept, against adultery, I shall touch
but lightly. Not that I consider the subject
unpleasant—far from it !— but since the English
section of my readers, having unclean minds,
will otherwise find a fulcrum therein for their
favourite game of slander. Let it suffice if
I say that the Buddha—in spite of the ridicu-
lous membrane legend,
* one of those foul follies
which idiot devotees invent only too freely—
was a confirmed and habitual adulterer. It
* Membrum virile illius in membrana inclusum
esse aiunt, ne copulare posset,
VOL. II,
would be easy to argue with Hegel-Huxley
that he who thinks of an act commits it (cf.
Jesus also in this connection, though he only
knows the creative value of desire), and that
since A and not-A are mutually limiting,
therefore interdependent, therefore identical,
he who forbids an act commits it; but I
feel that this is no place for metaphysical hair-
splitting; let us prove what we have to prove
in the plainest way.
I would premise in the first place that to
commit adultery in the Divorce Court sense
is not here in question.
It assumes too much proprietary right of a
man over a woman, that root of all abomina-
tion !—-the whole machinery of inheritance,
property, and all the labyrinth of law.
We may more readily suppose that the
Buddha was (apparently at least) condemning
incontinence.
We know that Buddha had abandoned his
home; true, but Nature has to be reckoned
with. Volition is no necessary condition of
offence. ‘I didn’t mean to”’ isa poor excuse
for an officer failing to obey an order.
Enough of this- in any case a minor ques-
tion ; since even on the lowest moral grounds—
and we, I trust, soar higher !—the error in
question may be resolved into a mixture of
murder, theft, and intoxication. (We consider
the last under the Fifth Precept.)
THE Four
tH Precerr,
Here we come to what in a way is the
fundamental joke of these precepts. A com-
mand is not a lie, of course; possibly cannot
be; yet surely an allegorical order is one in
essence, and [ have no longer a shadow of a
doubt that these so-called ‘‘precepts’’ are a
species of savage practical joke.
Apart from this there can hardly be much
doubt, when critical exegesis has done its
damnedest on the Logia of our’ Lord, that
Buddha did at some time commit himself to
some statement. ‘*(Something called) Con-
sciousness exists” is, said Huxley, the irre-
ducible minimum of the pseudo-syllogism,
false even for an enthymeme, ‘Cogito, ergo
sum!” This proposition he bolsters up by
Stating that whoso should pretend to doubt it,
would thereby but confirm it. Yet might it
not be said ‘‘ (Something called) Consciousness
appears to itself to exist,” since Consciousness
is itself the only witness to that confirmation?
Not that even now we can deny some kind of
existence to consciousness, but that it should
be a more real existence than ‘that of a reflec-
tion is doubtful, incredible, even inconceivable.
If by consciousness we mean the normal con-
sciousness, it is definitely untrue, since the
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