complices of the assassins.  Servia replies in terms of 
evasion, evasion impudently cynical.  Austria stirs.  Rus-
sia — and there is no pretense possible, the murder of 
the Archduke was either instigated by Panslavism or was 
a threat equally to the Tsar as to any other ruler — re-
plies by mobilizing. 
Sir Edward Grey spoke for peace, spoke of neutral-
ity, in the House of Commons at a moment when thou-
sands of British troops were already in Belgian waters, 
and the fleet, concentrated and ready for action, already 
held the North Sea.  
France withdrew her troops from the frontier "so as 
to avoid any possibility of incidents which might be mis-
taken for aggression," while her Algerian and Senegam-
bian troops were on the water, half-way to Marseilles.  
He knew that this time there was no hope of peace.  
Abdication itself would hardly have saved Germany from 
a long-prepared, carefully-planned war, a war whose 
avowed object, an object in the mouth of every man in 
the street, was the destruction of Austria, the dismem-
berment of Germany.  They had got him.  
Even a worm will turn; even a Quaker will fight if he 
is cornered.  
Wilhelm struck.  
I write in English for those English who count, and 
this is the proper way to view the matter.  Germany is a 
rich prize.  We can capture German trade, German 
manufactures, German shipping, German colonies.  We 
can exact an indemnity sufficient to cripple Germany for 
a dozen generations.  We can split Germany into six 
kingdoms or republics, and weaken her beyond repair 
forever.  We can double-cross Russia by insisting on the 
creation of a new Poland.  We can destroy the German 
fleet, and economize on dreadnoughts.  We can force 
our proletariat to accept conscription and starve off the 
social revolution.  We can drown the Irish question in 
Lethe; we can fight a general election on the war, and 
keep the present gang of politicians in office.